

1. F-5's : a) Is it a good idea?

b) Can we get out of the 10-12 M?

2. Fongate : (supposedly bona fide training mission — actually have been combat support).



(Has requirement actually been inconvenient? Incidents? Magnitude?)

Draft memo from Sec to CVCS on subject

(Check with State; then have McN check with CVCS before McN — Bushnell)

- 1) marked SVN
- 2) SVN must be along
- 3) War body — (cheaper)

(Dove want

(Are we doing this now with only chequer?)

1. Taylor: opposed a) mission to collect support; b) VN proves to warm bodies.

(McN wanted to shift

AI-E (B-57, F-100)

3-5 pm hours for VN pilots)

2. Status quo: "training mission"  
"training pilot"



Talk to State, Wed/Thurs

1) jet aircraft F-5, B-57

"Combat aircraft" 2) Less rules of engagement -

✓ 3) MACTHAI

✓ 4) 34A legitimize

5) starting 34A, + de Soto (hsr)

6) Famagusta role

then wants "and" (Bunelind/Wheeler:  
feel strongly: won't  
accept low-level "no"  
at State)

7) Use of US "advisors" on cross-border ops





Sept 21

F-55 B-57

~~B-57~~

Talk to Salbert

(if '65 problem is serious...)

B-57 (AF-100) flown in as US planes after Aug 5; now they fly some missions, in a vague, quiet way.

We trained 6-11 pilots — can fly now as copilots.

A-1(H) (single plane) can participate in attacks on NVN also AIE.

CINCPAC/JCS cool on jets; MACV hot, also Taylor, for prestige, and as follow-on.

But: eventually — e.g. against Cambodia.

(best bet)

Alt. 1: buying aircraft this year, for delivery early '66 start training. 10-12M out of '65 MAP.

Alt 2. Slip a year: delivery 66-early 67

(CINCPAC/JCS wants to hold up on 5th + 6th squadrons of A-1Hs, so does

How big a shot in the arm would the jets this year be?  
How big if in 66-67?



22 Dec Staff meeting

1. Westy needs \$100 million more to add 140,000 SVN troops to US Map-support. Alternatives: <sup>2)</sup> go for a supplemental in '65 <sup>FY</sup> or b) take it from the MAP for the Big Four (France, Turkey, China, ...)

McN: McN will go for (b).

~ Jk implies SVN has No. 1 priority in US foreign policy interests.

(Means SVN more important than (1) Big Four and (2) Big Four not worth supplemental.)

McN: <sup>1)</sup> But unhappy with our whole MAP program — destroyer for Turks, ships for Latin Americans — which they don't need for defense — just to buy off some clique that would otherwise go the wrong way.


Blowin: If you want to avoid crises...

2) Pres will not allow supplemental. He has used up points on Army Reserves. He doesn't want to take on Russell now then once a session. Affects his appointments, other bills; he needs committee approval for these...

2. NATO meeting.

For first time (starting about a month ago) French exposed semi-publicly that they don't want the Germans near nuclear weapons. It's inevitable in 50 years; how far can we push ahead.



- 
1. Premise we are "losing" :  $4 \times 1$ ,  $5 \times 1$  odds ~~margin~~.  
Then need for a plan specifically on that possibility.

Stakes:

3

1. Real estate; ability to safeguard rest of SEA.
2. Principle of willingness to help, guarantee
3. Range of competence + reliability as guarantor.

What has happened?

~~Old position: bad~~

Suppose



1. Is this the idea of the gov stability we laid as condition for striking North?


It is not ours. There will be no strikes against North unless SNC is restored and normal processes maintained.

Moreover, there will be no further preparatory actions: Laos

34A  
joint planning

} Wasn't Kham in favor of Palet generals?

7 Didn't Buddhists like Kham — because of anti-war actions?





(Measures ~~which~~ which military can control allocation  
so that civilians would not fight: Aid money, POC

Ask Taylor for measures which would require <sup>US</sup> approval

What are Kham's relations with generals?

Is it true that "meeting" was impending?

Deal with young Turks directly? do ~~over~~ mission talking to them?

What is attitude of military below young Turks?

e.g. what is subordinates' attitudes toward him, other old generals?

Blow

1. Evacuate US dependents: [exploit ambiguity: prepare with

Don't young Turks want a civilian govt? Don't they see  
impact of their actions on this possibility?

Costs: 1) to pacification program; VC. Slow GVN ops; improve  
VC losses.

2)

Moh: doctor: not emotionally involved. (1965 I went to him)



Military: material (equipment, fuel, ammo?)

US advisors: old; new.

Direct US close support: USAF; transport, helos.

34A: suspend Fannate

Any ops now planned needing US support?

Who do we pay directly? CAS, to individuals?

US strikes against infiltration targets in ~~the~~ Laos.

POC

Communications?

Repair, maintenance, spare parts

US contact with Buddhists

Young Turks

US planes withdrawn

Suspend Hop Tac (US advisors critical).

CIOG Program: withdrawing US elements

~~AD~~ Future appeal of strikes on North

Withholding future benefits:

1) increases in military pay refused

2) cessation of payments for POC imports under Commodity Import Program (we don't control allocations).

3) 5th + 6th VNAF squadrons.

A/D: Short-term

Control of US personnel

of US material

of US Airl. Payments:

of US declarations



Two approaches (~~compatible~~) to explanation  
of "Why we aren't attacking."

4: Intent of PTs not clear, since driven off  
without firing. (Our ships acted properly; PTs  
approached in menacing fashion, ignored warning shots.  
One or more may have been sunk.

[ If intent to attack were clear, how explain  
not responding

---



Q + A

4 45 + 4 5 6

1. Did they fire? No evidence

2. Did we hit anything? ~~(No)~~

B.D. 3. What is a routine patrol? What were they doing there?

4. Why do you think they did it? (Uncertain. Perhaps challenging our right to use international waters. No knowledge of any other actions; DRV has not claimed any. (?)

5. Why didn't we strike back?

Lacking evidence that boats actually fired, we can't say incontrovertibly their intent. May have been a feint; if so, dangerous for them.

6. What next? Will patrols be continued? How close?

(Yes: we don't intend to be threatened or feinted out of our rights, any more than we)

7.

Their behavior <sup>was</sup> fully justified <sup>in</sup> the defensive fire of the destroyers. But ~~the fact that they did not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~open~~ <sup>open</sup> firing before being driven off,



Pres: I don't believe the boats were there.

Reul: I'm 99% sure they were.

Pres: I don't believe it. I'd

White Paper 19th Sept

Why do boats patrol? Mil; polit; psycholog.

Reul: Important politically to have occasional showings to the Politburo

b) Show costs to DRV of patrols (34+).

c) What to do (options) if ship hit; what will they do (in this nervous state).

d)



2) White Paper

b) Taylor weekly report

C. 1) If attacked - Aug 2

2) If signif. damage

3) If sunk

Why? Why now (when so infrequent earlier?) Why not planes?

Adm. Mission,

Cdr. Fitzwater, Cdr. Roth,



Get rid of East Germany (Ulbricht).

Plant seeds; proposals get rejected and die.

Law makers don't get involved on foreign affairs.

Will military get position in Presidency?

Nov 57

NATO's problem - keep members (including US) from unilateral initiatives

Use Dec. meeting to concert policy toward the

Nielson

232-0005

1. Bundy - Nitze - Anderson
2. Clearances. return book. PAC.
- 3.

Co



Fred Janny OCI

— 19 March 64 Coming Struggle for Power in the USSR.

OCI 0694/64

— NIE 11-63 Main Trends in Sov Foreign Policy

May 63 : question of succession.

Internal  
Bloc  
Foreign } ranking of power struggles

clues in Pravda.

Will reassure people that people's champion was

Unstable.

Arguments over policy : US will influence.



Pres. missed opportunity last night — cooperation

And time to boast over nuclear

(Handliners can point to effects of pressure from Goldwater)

— { FD/S Daily Report  
Friday Oct 9, Supp. 11 } Brezhnev speech

May take couple of years.



Δ<sup>N</sup>

Wolfe


Robert Conquest: ~~On~~ <sup>The</sup> Succession Problem

Myron Rush - book

John Thomas - RAC - criticizing Mil Review: "After Mao + K: What?"



16 Oct

1030 Leon Halpern 4088 

Fred Jannay 7225

Al Valpey 7254

Halpern: The Army & the Succession Problem

(last problem took 4 years; how long this time?)

[Pres speech]

Unstable. Who ultimately will control?

Strength of technocrats, managers has grown enormously recently, relative to apparatchiks.

(in the Council of Ministers)

Presidium people split between Secretariat and the Council.

Braverman no one in both.

K has vacated Supreme Commander Post.

and RFSSR Bureau (daily decision-making).

Chairman of Higher Military Council

[Collect statements on K/SU in past

Speeches in which K speaks only summarized  
were in past controversial, important: K attacked.

Call RAND

Haven't been able to identify foreign policy views  
differing from K's (except Kozlov: sand-moved).  
Good evidence of differences on resource allocation.



i. How did RLAF get authority for CAP

Follow-up Brownhill on 34A

1. Study: need as follow-up to Section studies
2. Report: Air Attacks Admin. Matters:

What studies: CAP or not?

160420Z from CINCPAC

DIA

Capt. Massie 55317

Maj. Flannigan 59708



# Newsweek

A photograph of a shirtless man with a bandaged arm and a soldier in a tiger-striped helmet. The man is standing in a field of tall grass, looking down. The soldier is kneeling next to him, holding his arm. The man's arm is wrapped in a dark cloth, and there is a visible wound on his hand. The soldier is wearing a helmet with a tiger stripe pattern and a green uniform. The background is a field of tall grass.

*Viet Cong*

APRIL 12, 1965 35c

Profile  
of the  
Viet  
Cong